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This paper will be a general study into how theory informs policy. It is also a specific study into the 
National Development Plan and the Post Washington Consensus. It will come to general 
conclusions about how the policy formulation process informs the eventual policy that is adopted 
and how dominant trends in thinking can find themselves in development strategy. These 
conclusions will be based on the specific data obtained regarding the Post Washington Consensus, 
The National Development Plan (NDP) and literature about how policy is formulated and realized. 
The three main themes will be exploring the nature of the Post Washington Consensus, the nature of 
the Development Plan and how this relationship came to be.   
 
The National Development Plan is the latest incarnation of ANC economic policy; this time around 
it is being advanced as a credible plan that outlines the path that must be taken by the country for us 
to address the plethora of problems South African society is facing. This policy differs from 
previous incarnations of economic policy in two critical respects that make it a worthwhile subject 
of study. The first is in how the policy has been packaged and presented, not as an economic policy 
but rather an all encompassing developmental strategy. The second critical difference is in how the 
policy was formulated, shifting completely from the closed technocratic process of the previous 
incarnations to the ostensibly more open and participatory National Development Plan, 
incorporating the views of a multitude of experts as well as opening up the process to limited public 
participation.  The Plan has found a resounding amount of approval having being vetted by the 
African National Congress, government, the Democratic Alliance (the country's official opposition) 
and significant amounts of private sector leadership. The only significant resistance to the plan has 
come from COSATU, and most vociferously from its affiliate NUMSA. The process of the NDP's 
development has been unique in post-apartheid economic policy formulation, being drafted by 
commissioners from varying theoretical orientations, in this regard, ostensibly sharing some of the 
consultative elements of the RDP. 
 
Paradoxically then, the economic policy that emerges from the plan largely follows the progression 
of ANC economic policy post GEAR whilst completely sidelining the Industrial Policy Action Plan 
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and to a lesser yet still significant extent the New Growth Path. Departing from the top-down 'non-
negotiable' GEAR strategy, the NDP was supposed to represent South Africa more comprehensively 
and draw up a plan to adequately address the problems of South Africa. Alongside these 
developments in South African economic policy, dominant global mainstream economic thinking 
has not remained static. Parallel to the changes in domestic economic policies have been changes in 
mainstream economic policy advice to developing nations. The most important of these changes has 
been the once dominate Washington Consensus gradually being supplanted by the seemingly more 
palatable post-Washington Consensus. 
 
This thesis is thus concerned with three sets of interrelating issues. Generally they are the issues of 
the broad theoretical framework which informs the economic policy contained within the NDP. 
How these are viewed is through an analysis of the Post Washington Consensus, the National 
Development Plan‟s economic policy and literature concerning how theory informs policy. Meaning 
that an investigation of how and to what extent the parallel developments in the internationally 
dominant economic policy advice have been incorporated into the NDP and how this has affected 
the potential efficacy of the economic policy in the South African context. The findings of this 
phase of the investigation will come from an examination of the economic policy itself and selected 
literature describing the shift from the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington Consensus.  
  
The second set of issues relate to how and to what extent this theoretical orientation or framework 
affected the process of drafting and adopting the NDP. How much of the plan is influenced by the 
developments in international mainstream economic thinking and how do these influences affect 
how the policy implementation and its efficacy. The conclusions of this phase of the investigation 
will also come from the NDPs economic policy and literature focusing on the shift in the 
mainstream economic thinking. The final phase of the investigation looks briefly at the policy 
formulation process and sees to what extent the novelty of the NDP process made a substantial 
difference to the policy prescriptions of the NDP. 
 
This thesis will then conclude with a determination, based on the available literature on which 
theoretical perspective informs the policy prescriptions of the National Development Plan. This will 
be complemented by a determination of whether this policy formulation process was successful in 
bringing about the developmental policy that South Africa requires and whether it was substantially 




Research Method  
 
This thesis has been conducted using secondary data, which was sufficient for achieving the aims 
and objectives of the thesis. The method that will be used to address the first set of issues relating to 
the theoretical foundation of the National Development Plan will be a review of the National 
Development Plan itself, focusing specifically on Chapter 3 of the plan. Alongside the plan itself, 
interpretations and critiques of the plan will also be examined. Secondly, The Post-Washington 
Consensus literature will also be read and contrasted with the policy recommendations made in the 
chapters of the NDP that will be reviewed. The last set of literature that is to be explored relates to 
the making of policy and how theory feeds into the process. The literature will be used to determine 






















Literature Review  
 
This literature review will explore three principal themes, each of which has an associated set of 
literature. This chapter aims to gives a review of the literature that was analysed in the course of this 
investigation.  
 
The first theme that will be explored is the policy prescriptions of the National Development Plan 
focused on employment and the economy. Specifically, it will home in on Chapter 3 of the National 
Development Plan. The set of literature that will be explored for this theme is Chapter 3 of 
Development Plan, the commissioned and existing literature which was used as the academic basis 
for the plan, known collectively as the diagnostic reports, as well as the literature that has developed 
around it, including the associated critiques. The core of the analysis of this set of literature will 
understand the economy and employment as envisaged by the plan, whilst understanding it as the 
latest incarnation of the African National Congress's economic policy.  
 
Policy prescriptions of the National Development Plan 
 
After an analysis of the chapter, a critical examination of the major problem areas will be explored 
in the findings chapter. Chapter 3 of the NDP begins with an identification of the 'economic 
challenge', the structural constraints faced by our economy. The first and most crucial issue that the 
plan identifies is the fragile nature of our economy, expressed through the skewed pattern of 
ownership and control of key economic resources, patterns that have been inherited from the 
Apartheid dispensation NDP (2011, p110).  
 
The consequences of this are the differences in employment levels and income differentials, where 
the differences have been “...principally racially defined but also include skill levels, gender and 
location NDP (2011, p110). Proceeding from this insight, the plan's analysis places South Africa in 
“...a low growth, middle income trap.” What is meant by this is explained by the low growth, 
middle income trap is summarized into four elements that are described as reinforcing each other, 
and these four elements are the low levels of competition for goods and services, large numbers of 
work seekers who cannot enter the labour market, low savings and a poor skills profile. 
Additionally, there is considerable pressure on natural resources, energy constraints, spatial 
misalignments, and limited access to large markets because of geographical distance which are 
identified as further weaknesses NDP (2011, p.113) An immediate insight is that even though the 
plan correct indentifies these income and skills differentials, the intellectual foundations of the 
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employment scenarios used in the diagnostic, in this case Evidence-based Employment Scenarios by 
Dr. Miriam Altman, are suspect. More specifically, there is a central methodological problem with 
the paper, as can be seen with one of the assumptions “In this light, the South African government 
has adopted targets of halving unemployment and poverty by 2014. This would reduce 
unemployment from about 26% in 2004 to 13% in 2014. This paper assembles a set of possible 
scenarios for 2024, on the basis of the assumption that the 2014 target is met. It is assumed that 
Government would like to see “full employment” by 2024, which in these scenarios is assumed to 
an unemployment rate of 6.5%” Altman (2008, p.3). It is clear that the halving of the unemployment 
rate has not happened (now in 2014), and on reflection, seems like it was very optimistic target. 
More problematically, the employment scenarios consider employment in the “Informal sector” 
(which Altman sees as including subsistence agriculture, domestic work … shops or informal 
mechanics). These employment scenarios include the idea of absorbing considerable amounts of the 
unemployed into the informal sector. Not only does this make us seriously question the employment 
targets that are set in the NDP, it also invites more serious questions about the quality of work 
envisaged both by Dr Altman and the NDP (a policy she was instrumental in writing). 
 
The plan places South Africa in the advantageous position of having specific areas of comparative 
advantage. Listed as the areas of comparative advantage are its natural endowments (including 
minerals), a strong fiscal position, its location on the continent, a strong and deep financial services 
sector, quality universities and a small yet extremely developed services industry NDP (2011, p. 
115) These insights are used to set the stage for the structural challenges that we face that are 
similar to those of other countries and this is used to drive the analysis of the structural challenges 
faced specifically by the South African economy. According to the plan, the structural challenges 
that are similar to other developing economies are the fact that we share the 'Resource curse, 
Middle-income trap, Global economic downturn, the youth bulge, the changing nature of work and 
our resource intensive economy NDP (2011, p. 116). 
 
The plan goes on to identify the key elements for employment creation NDP (2011, p117) as 
establishing an environment for sustainable employment and economic growth. It aims to achieve 
this by concentrating on labour-absorbing industries. This is done alongside promoting exports and 
competitiveness. Drastic improvements in the capacity of the government would be also be 
required, especially in its ability to implement economic policy. The government is seen as playing 
a strategic leadership role, mobilising key stakeholders around the vision expressed in the chapter 
described in the plan as a national vision NDP (2011, p121). The key elements of employment 
creation are in line with those advocated for by Altman in the 2008 HSRC report; however, the 
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mechanism that is being offered is puzzling. The plan tells us that more than 90% of the new jobs 
that will be created will be by SMME‟s. This seems beyond optimistic, especially without detailing 
how the support structures for these businesses will be strengthened.    
Two strategies on how to develop and maintain growth acceleration are offered, albeit not in depth. 
There are to increase the rate of investment and raising our proportion of the global market share. 
This is to be done by stimulating exports and more crucially promoting domestically oriented 
economic activity. Our economy is argued to be an integral part of regional growth. Labour 
relations are seen in a 'responsive labour market' explained as governed by civil relations, equitable 
dispensations of value generated. Public sector labour should be conducive to delivery and 
employment objectives. An increase in the skills supply is alluded to, and more thoroughly argued 
in Chapter 8. Lastly, improvements are suggested to the Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA), bargaining councils and the labour court to address the inflexibility of our 
labour market NDP (2011, p133). 
Following this, the character of the economic transformation that is desired is developed. The 
essential features are workplace opportunity and employment equity, which is a defence of the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998. Changing patterns of ownership in the economy is a priority. 
Concentration is identified as “...a barrier to business entry and expansion in key markets, which are 
essential for employment creation NDP (2011, p114).” It argues that in its current manifestation, 
black economic empowerment (BEE) has not been successful in achieving its intended 
consequences, chief among which was reducing the amounts of concentration so as to facilitate 
employment creation. The reduction of concentration in the long-term will lead to rapid economic 
growth that will somehow “...focus on spreading opportunities for black people as it grows NDP 
(2011, p114)” They argue that this would involve enhancing the quality of education, business 
advice and guidance for entrepreneurs, an increased emphasis on career mobility, workplace 
training and financial inclusion for the marginalized. Three avenues are identified as the potential 
solutions namely, “[g]overnment procurement, licensing and other forms of economic rents should 
help reduce racial patterns of ownership of wealth and income” NDP (2011, p114). Economic 
Transformation in the South African context is a subject that the NDP looks at cursorily; however, 
recent work in the heterodoxy has resulted in useful ways of examining and understanding the 
South African economy.  The minerals energy complex is a concept which allows for a more 
targeted understanding of the pattern of accumulation in the South African economy, a concept that 
could have added analytically to the plan. This concept is not used by the plan however. 
 
Other features of economic transformation are successful land reform, improved business support to 
SMMEs, creating an agro-industrial cluster, minerals and metals cluster, manufacturing, the 
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construction-infrastructure cluster, the green economy, the finance sector, retail and business 
services, tourism and culture, public sector employment and public employment schemes. The 
chapter is concluded with the recommendation that there should be a social compact which is 
characterised increased trust between the state and business, this seen as key to eliminating poverty, 
reducing inequality and create jobs. The social compact, made up of critical role players and society 
at large, will use the NDP as its basis NDP (2011, p156). SMMEs are seen as being the key drivers 
of the economy and will be responsible for 90% of the jobs created. This is despite their current 
position as job shedders, also research suggests that people with a matric level education are less 
likely to be employed by SMMEs than their lesser educated counterparts Amra et al (2013, p. 4). 
Simply put they loss instead of creating jobs, therefore relying on them for job creation without a 
clear plan of how to improve this seems strange. 
There are several major issues with the chapter as economic policy. There is no simple discussion, 
let alone analysis of macroeconomic variables. There is no formal economic modelling, and 
concerningly no reason is given as to why this is the case. Alternatives were not modelled and tested 
against different scenarios with different policy inputs. This glaring omission leaves open the door 
of speculation, were there attempts to model that went horribly wrong or that produced conclusions 
that we never going to be trusted. The fact is we do not know why this omission was made, but if it 
was intentional, the NDP should have documented and explained the decision and the merits of 
their approach. Alarmingly, the NDP again seems to have been fuelled by the notion that South 
Africa needs to adopt policy that will attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) so as to make up for 
the saving-investment deficit. The literature reveals, however, that levels of FDI in South Africa 
have been appallingly low Mosia (2012, p. 3). This is the case despite attracting FDI being a central 
policy objective of GEAR and AsgiSA Mosia (2012, p. 2). The economy has managed to attract 
short-term, volatile, high interest flows to back long-term capital outflows.  Another grave charge 
that is dealt with later on in this paper is that the NDP ignores the impact, scale or even existence of 
these long term capital outflows. What is not in doubt is that certainly doesn‟t contain any analysis 
of them. 
 
In addition, the plan's attempt at addressing the unemployment is very weak. It has been well 
documented that one of the gravest challenges that South Africa is facing is the issue of widespread 
unemployment, with the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for the second quarter of 2013 
placing the official figure at 25.6 % and the broader definition being considerably higher Amra et al 
(2013, p. 1). This clearly means that the economic policy that is pursued by South Africa must, in 
the first instance, address issues relating to unemployment. How is the problem of unemployment 
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addressed in the NDP? The solution that is proposed, as described earlier, ignores the established 
work regarding the increasing rates of return in the manufacturing sector, thus deserving an 
adequate industrial policy.  This results in the plan under-emphasising the role of industrialization in 
the process of development and employment generation. This is a consequence that is clearly 
demonstrated by the sidelining of the Department of Trade and Industry's Industrial Policy Action 
Plan. 
 
Additional oversights are that the plan itself neglects any significant analysis of macroeconomic 
variables but, more problematically it does not direct any analysis to the issue of capital flight. The 
proposed strategic interventions in the finance sector fall far short of addressing the genuine 
problem of capital flight. Furthermore, the plan misunderstands the developmental impact of local 
procurement NDP (2001, p.40). Even though it is mentioned, it is seemingly not understood as 
having the possibility of being part of an integrated manufacturing sector, with linkages based on 
policies like preferential local procurement, especially in strategically important sectors like 
production of capital goods. Research has shown that the impact on the development of small 
businesses of developmental procurement can be profound Foresti et al (2005, p.2). This indicates 
that the there is enormous potential for local procurement to play a pivotal role in economic policy, 
the NDP, fails to recognize this.  
 
 
The Post-Washington Consensus 
 
The second theme that will be explored is The Post-Washington Consensus whether the policy can 
be broadly characterised as being part of. The Washington Consensus argues that effective and 
feasible economic reforms need a politico-institutional foundation. The work of Joseph Stiglitz has 
been incredibly influential in terms of defining and articulating the Post Washington Consensus. 
Assistance has been provided “...by other major figures within the dominant academic and policy-
making circles of North America have also played a significant role. Dani Rodrik, Paul Krugman, 
Stanley Fischer, William Easterly and Ravi Kanbur... Öniş and Şenses (2005, p274)” Broadly, this 
literature attempts to argue that the failures in policy reform, poor public management, and rent 
seeking can be interpreted as instances of institutional failure and therefore addressing these failures 
will lead to smoother functioning of markets. Stiglitz argues that the Post-Washington Consensus 
understands and builds on the failures of the Washington Consensus. This formulation emphasises 
effective governance structures, which provide adequate incentive structures to cope with the 
failures of public management, policy reform and rent seeking Ahrens (2008, p. 3). Their focus is 
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on the interaction of the economy and the polity. The resulting concept of governance is developed; 
Ahrens goes on to argue that this concept is pivotal component of a post-Washington Consensus.  
 
 
The question of whether this conception of government is the one expressed in the NDP, the answer 
is the affirmative. The most striking characteristic of the conception of governance in the Post-
Washington Consensus is the facilitative role that government plays for the market, expressed by 
the limitations of the interventions that government are bound by. Both Stiglitz and Ahrens argue 
that the state's role is to address the market failures that clearly exist. However, a common thread 
amongst the Post-Washington Consensus literature is that the scope of government intervention is 
not wide enough to accommodate extensive industrial policy. It is also important to bear in mind 
that even there are significant similarities in the literature to allow us to analyse it, however “...it 
would be wrong to talk about the PWC as a monolithic entity (Öniş and Şenses 2005, p274).” This 
is true as although the particularly facilitative role of government is emphasised, departure from 
market fundamentalism is evident. Additional components of Stigliz's conception include provisions 
for a particular economy's context to be a guide in policy making, a significant departure from the 
orthodox economic policy of the Washington Consensus. Stiglitz acknowledges that “...that one size 
fits all policies are doomed to failure. (Stiglitz 2008, p9)”  
 
Focusing particularly on the cluster strategy for manufacturing as an example of the limits of the 
scope and scale that the government is given in terms of interventions by the NDP is the next task. 
The plan suggests that “[t]he most important contributions to manufacturing expansion will be in 
relation to the business environment NDP (2011, p148).” First, it must be noted that this is complete 
accordance with the conception of the role of government, as described above. Second, none of the 
known strategies to promote industrial activity are explored; there is no mention of infant industry 
protection. However, research and development is identified as being necessary however, no 
government plans on how to ensure it is actually there and adequately resourced are presented. 
 
This leave no other option but to draw a link between the conception of state intervention in the 
development plan and the conception of state intervention in this literature, and thus classifying the 




The third set of literature that will be explored focuses on the process of policy formulation and 
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how the NDP fits into the economic policy continuum of the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Guiding the thinking of how the NDP relates to the economic policy continuum of the ANC in post-
apartheid South Africa is Economist Ben Turok, who has worked extensively on the subject. For the 
process of policy formulation, Ingram, Schneider & Deleon's thinking was both incredibly 
instructive and useful. 
 
The process of developing the plan represented a marked departure from the way economic policy 
has been developed in post-apartheid South Africa (Turok 2008, 45). The planning commission was 
set up by President Zuma to author a national development plan. How this commission came to the 
policy is a crucial part of this research enquiry. It is important to be able to “...explain why public 
policy, which can have such a positive effect on society, sometimes-and often deliberately-fails in 
its nominal purposes, fails to solve important public problems, perpetuates injustice, fails to support 
democratic institutions, and produces an unequal citizenship.” (Ingram, Schneider and Deleon, 1999 
in Sabitier 2007, page ). This insight is important because it confirms that in order to successfully 
develop policy; it is of paramount importance to understand the causes for failure of the preceding 
policies. Has this been done by the NPC? Perhaps, however, the conclusions from that thinking are 
not made available in the NDP.  
 
Even with that analysis missing, the structure of how the plan was to be formulated was novel and 
ostensibly far more consultative than any previous process. The question that follows is was there a 
corresponding shift in the policy that reflected its new consultative form? Not as significant as the 
change in the process. The question of why this was the case cannot be settled by the literature and 
can only be explored once data has been collected from participants of the process, which shall be 



















The findings chapter will be presented as an examination and discussion of the critical issues that 
are brought out by the literature which was reviewed in the previous chapter. In this sense, the 
chapter aims to come to a determination on important questions relating to the intellectual 
foundations of the Post-Washington Consensus, the National Development Plan and the process that 
was used to arrive at it. All these sets of interrelating issues will be exposed by a critical 
examination of the three sets of literature. The chapter will begin with the critical issues facing the 
Post-Washington Consensus, so as to develop an appropriate contextual and theoretical 
understanding of the Policy. The main issues in this part of the analysis will revolve around 
understanding the shift from the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington Consensus and the 
essential features of the Post-Washington Consensus. Here the determination will be that there is 
very little conceptual difference between the prescripts of the Washington and Post-Washington 
Consensuses and that the essential, neo-liberal prescripts of the consensus are so similar to those of 
the Washington Consensus that it should not be thought of a policy shift as much as policy 
augmentation, with the revolution/evolution dichotomy proving useful to differentiate them. The 
essential features of the Post-Washington Consensus will then be laid bare. Determinations here will 
be that even the PWC is a genuine change in mainstream; however, the change is not effectual in 
any meaningful sense.  Once this has been determined, the analysis will then shift to a stripping 
down of the essential features of the National Development Plan. The plan will then be compared 
with the Post-Washington Consensus where it will become evident that the NDP shares too 
significant an amount of overlap to not think that one influenced the other. These will be because of 
the nature of role of that government is seen to play, competition policy, regulation and controlling 
inflation. The final part of this chapter will examine how the policy formulation process played a 
role in the linkage between the NDP and PWC. 
   
 




The Post-Washington Consensus is the counterpoint for this thesis and thus deserves appropriate 
attention, especially if the task is to determine whether the NDP is founded on the same principles. 
In order to make this determination we shall explore two avenues of analysis.  The first avenue of 
analysis centres on what relationship the Post-Washington Consensus has with the Washington-
consensus itself. This contextual clarification will result in an improved understanding of how and 
to what extent a shift the policy orientation of international development policy advice had on 
eventual South African development policy. The second avenue of analysis centres on the essential 
features of the Post-Washington Consensus. After this analysis, the link between the NDP and the 
Post-Washington Consensus will firmly be established. Because the plan shares thinking concerning 
controlling inflation, encouraging competition and enacting competition policy, continuing 
privatization,  reducing the size of government, budget deficit and the current account deficit and 
other significant areas it will be argued that this makes the NDP, economic policy that broadly 
conforms with the Post-Washington Consensus and, as shall be argued Washington Consensus 
ideals, this leads to has implications for the potential success of the development strategy. These 
implications are negative for South Africa, as will become evident and more explicit later (Page 
Whatever I write the explanations of the implications). It will be argued that this link can only be as 
a result of the nature of the policy formulation.  
 
To begin, Standing (2000) gives a usefully succinct account of the various components of the 
Washington Consensus; this account lays the perfect foundation for a discussion about the shift to 
the PWC.  The components of WC 
“...are trade liberalisation, financial liberalisation, privatisation, “deregulation”, foreign 
capital liberalisation (elimination of barriers to FDI), secure property rights, unified and 
competitive exchange rates, diminished public spending (fiscal discipline), public 
expenditure switching (to health, schooling and infrastructure), tax reform (broadening the 
tax base, cutting marginal tax rates, less progressive tax), and a “social safety net” 
(selective state transfers for the needy) Standing (1999) in Fine (2002, p.134).   
Understanding the shift then between the PWC and the WC is assisted by understanding why the 
policy shift was made. Was the Washington Consensus struggling and reeling, at crisis point? Had 
the loss of legitimacy as the failure of Structural Adjustment Programs become more apparent led 
the shift to the PWC? What role does Stiglitz' own work, relating to his information theoretic 
approach, play in the PWC? In articulating the Post-Washington Consensus, the Senior Vice 
President and Chief Economist to the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz argued at his now famous talk 
titled More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post–Washington Consensus that 
the Washington Consensus' focus on inflation has had two significant results, first being that it 
17 
 
produced macroeconomic policies that were not necessarily the most conducive for long-term 
economic growth. Second was that it reduced focus on other major sources of macro-instability 
Stiglitz (1997, p.12) He goes on to argue that the Washington Consensus neglected competition as a 
factor to consider 
 
“...in focusing on trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, policymakers ignored 
other important ingredients, most notably competition, that are required to make an effective 
market economy and which may be at least as important as the standard economic 
prescriptions in determining long- term economic success” Stiglitz (1997, p.12)  
 
Fine (2001) points out that this being argued by Stiglitz, whom was a clearly a Washington insider 
at the time meant that “...the Washington Consensus was under assault from within” Fine (2001, 
p.2) This allows us to to understand that the PWC sees itself at addressing this single-minded 
obsession with inflation and the ignorance of competition of the original Washington Consensus or 
introducing new aspects of the problem to address. Stiglitz conceived it as a broadening of the goals 
and tools of the Washington-Consensus. This is important because Stiglitz' re-conceptualisation of 
the economic development agenda was seen by him, as anchoring policy in a sounder understanding 
of the economy. Whether or not this is actually the case is a question that is central in determining 
which interpretation of the shift is more implausible.       
 
Ultimately, the interpretation the nature of the shift from the Washington-consensus and the Post-
Washington Consensus is dominated by two broads and opposing schools of thought. In short, does 
it represent a departure from neoliberal thinking or merely more of the same? The answers to this 
question play a large role in determining the trends in thinking.  Ruckert 2006 choosing not to take 
sides between the mainstream and the heterodoxy, he argues that the shift is more complex than it 
initially appears. He notes that there is a significant impasse in understanding the relevance of this 
policy shift Ruckert (2006, p13). He argues that the Post-Washington Consensus neither represents 
a fundamental rupture with the Washington Consensus nor an attempt to reproduce the same 
neoliberal policy regime. Rather, he suggests an alternative, an idea of 'inclusive neoliberalism' and 
maintains that the Post-Washington Consensus is the first step towards the emergence of an 
inclusive-neoliberal regime of development in the global economy. His evidence for this claim 
however is questionable at best.  The first problem with Ruckert's inclusive neoliberalism is not 
only the fact that it has failed, in empirical terms, to materialise, but also its foundation in Ruckert's 




The most compelling interpretation is that the shift is presented by critics of the development 
establishment that argue that the policy changes that it involve the Post-Washington Consensus do 
not represent a fundamental shift away from neoliberal policy practices examples include Fine 
(2001) Neither Washington Consensus nor the Post-Washington Consensus. It is compelling 
because the shift was made to broaden the tools and goals of the Washington Consensus and not in 
order to review its founding neoliberal principles. This is important, because the reasons for the 
failure of the Washington Consensus are disputed. Proponents of the PWC argue that the 
Washington Consensus failed due to its narrow goals and tools; however, a more detailed reading of 
the evidence suggests that the shortcomings of the Washington Consensus were not its limited 
scope, but rather its intellectual foundations, foundations, which are not addressed never mind 
reviewed by the Post Washington Consensus. Secondly, critics of the consensus do not argue that it 
offers no change; rather that it does actually broaden the scope by finally acknowledging market 
failures. However, the critics do point out that even though this is done by an approach tied to its 
own understanding of market imperfections it completely ignores the criticism of the Washington 
Consensus. It suffers from a lot of the same weaknesses as a result, and thus it represents a false 
discontinuity of policy.  
 
Essential features of the Post-Washington Consensus 
 
After having developed an understanding the shift in IMF and World Bank policy, it can be seen 
that there was in fact a shift in policy that has been characterised as the Post-Washington 
Consensus. What are the essential features of this PWC and what are the intellectual foundations of 
the PWC. This is an important step in our analysis as it will provide the criteria which will be used 
to compare the NDP, that is, the essential features of the PWC will be compared with the 
pronouncements of the NDP to establish if there is significant enough overlap to conclude that the 
NDP was influenced by the PWC. The central thrust of the PWC is reconceptualing the centrality of 
the State v Market thinking of the WC, by replacing it the thinking that sees government acting as a 
complement to markets. Said in simple terms, the Washington Consensus prescribed that the state 
should not intervene in the market whereas as the PWC suggests that the government can, in fact, 
intervene in the market, however, this intervention is limited to steps to steps that would improve 
the workings of the market. 
The theoretical or intellectual foundation of the Post-Washington can be traced back to the 
involvement of Joseph Stiglitz. Ruckert 2006 views the Post-Washington Consensus as being the 
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convergence between the neoliberal concepts of the Washington-Consensus and the theory of 
information theoretic approach pioneered by Joseph Stiglitz. Fine concurs with this understanding 
by himself suggesting that central to the PWC is the connection between Stiglitz' own academic 
work and essentials from “...laissez-faire dogma”. Fine argues that the motivating idea of the PWC 
can readily be identified in Stiglitz' work over the preceding two decades. That motivating idea is 
market imperfections are the only possible justification for state intervention Fine (2001, p. 4). He 
points out that this line of thinking has been around for a while, what is novel in this approach is the 
conceptualisation of a market failure. Along with this, market failure is seen in terms only of the 
conditions of neoliberal constraints including the presence of externalities or monopolistic pricing. 
Asymmetries of information of multiple kinds like transactional costs can also be the cause of 
market failure. In addition Fine contends that “...in formal modelling, the analytical basis for the 
PWC is extremely narrow and weak, especially from the perspective of anyone not wedded to 
mainstream economics” Fine (2001, p. 6).  The two fundamental characteristics of the analytical 
basis of the PWC are; firstly a reductionism to individual behaviour and secondly a reductionism to 
market imperfections based on informational imperfections. 
 
An understanding of the theoretical foundations of the PWC can only be complemented with an 
explication of the concepts that are essential to this approach. What are these concepts and which 
ones originate from the original consensus and which are anchored in Stiglitz' own work. What 
follows is an analytical explication of these concepts in order to make these determinations. In 
addition, this phase of the analysis is also important because it is these central concepts that will be 
compared to the policy prescriptions of the NDP in order to determine the relationship between the 
PWC and the NDP. 
 
Controlling inflation  
 
First on the menu is the critical idea that the management of the inflation rate is vitally important to 
the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. Stiglitz tries to reduce the importance of the policy of 
inflation targeting by still insisting that it is important to make sure that the inflation rate is 
controlled yet it should not be the only focus when stabilising the macroeconomic environment. 
Specifically, Stiglitz states that “In [his] view the conclusion to be drawn from this research is that 
controlling high and medium-rate inflation should be a fundamental policy priority but that pushing 
low inflation even lower is not likely to significantly improve the functioning of markets” Stiglitz 
(1998, p. 7). This concession to the work of  Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) that finds that low 
levels of inflation may even improve economic performance relative to what it would have been 
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with zero inflation, does not mean that the Stiglitz doesn't argue for aggressive, pre-emptive strikes 
against inflation. The question, left unaddressed by Stiglitz, is still how to ensure that these 
aggressive, pre-emptive strikes do not turn into the single-minded obsession with controlling the 
inflation rate that has become characteristic of Washington Consensus influenced Central Banks 
like the South African Reserve Bank. 
It is clear that this concept was central to the Washington Consensus and has been slightly modified 
in the PWC. However, as discussed earlier, these modifications are not significant enough to ensure 
an understanding in respective central banks that their work is not limited to the maintenance of 
acceptable levels of inflation. As shall be shown later, if the neoclassical roots of the WC had been 
discarded, some literature in the heterodoxy has important suggestions of how central banks can 
plausibly expand their scope to target and focus on other, arguably more important macroeconomic 
variables, not least unemployment. The PWC doesn't discard the neoclassical roots of the WC and 
thus doesn't contain these crucial strategies.  
 
Encouraging competition and enacting competition policy 
 
The emphasis on competition and competition policy is a strong component of the PWC. 
Competition policy is in fact one of the main reasons that Stiglitz cited as one of the crucial factors 
for the shift of to the PWC. He argues that competition is central to the successful functioning of a 
market economy. He maintains that trade liberalization is important, but full benefits of liberalizing 
trade will not be achieved in the absence of creating a competitive economy. Developing countries 
are seen by Stiglitz as being characterised by imperfect competition, meaning their economies 
exhibit competition that is suppressed, for reasons including implicit collusion and predatory 
pricing. The enacting of effective antitrust laws for developing countries is argued as being essential 
to their economic development. Stiglitz notes that competition policy also has considerable 
implications for trade policy; however he doesn't make the connection that these two policies can be 
part of a comprehensive development strategy. What is true is that when it comes to competition 
and competition policy is that their analytical importance (from the Washington Consensus to the 
Post Washington Consensus) has grown considerably over time. Cramer (1999, p.10) notes that 
“[c]ompetition and regulation policies are central to the Post-Washington Consensus, having been 
peripheral at best to the Washington Consensus”.  
Weaknesses with the PWC understanding of competition come from a failure of this theory to 
adequately interact with the broader discussion of industrial policy.  Cramer goes as far as arguing 
that there is no reason to believe that there is a difference between the Washington Consensus' view 
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of the relationship between privatization and industrial policy and the PWC conception of the very 
same relationship. He suggests that the Washington Consensus' view of this relationship was 
simplistic and reductionist in the sense that privatization was not presented as one amongst many 
tools that exist for a government's industrial policy rather privatization is presented as industrial 
policy. The same problem applies to the PWC. 
Cramer (1999) however argues that Stiglitz is, in his conception of the Post-Washington Consensus, 
guilty of over-identifying a basic conception of competition with developmental objectives Cramer 
(1999, p. 8) He describes it as basic because the important delineation of the source of the 
competition is not made or in other terms, there is a difference between internal, domestic 
competition and external, foreign competition that is not accounted for. This is a problem, 
especially because a strong case can be made for a developing economy government to foster 
domestic competition whilst limiting foreign competition for an initial, finite period of time. This 
kind of thinking has its roots with Friedrich List, Alexander Hamilton and Ha-Joon Chang in more 
recent times. The importance of the infant industry protection literature on ideas of economic 
development cannot be overstated, however, due to the PWCs simplistic view of competition the 
argument that some kinds of competition should be suppressed for strategic reasons cannot be 
understood in its framework. Therefore experiences like the Madagascan government's intervention 
of limiting external competition from its vanilla sector in the 1960s to guarantee the quality and 
regularity of supply leading to the country gaining more than 90% of the market share cannot be 
sensibly understood. Cramer (1999, p. 9) goes on to insist that was is missing from the Washington 
approach is the absence of the comprehension that restricted competition and industrial regulation 
might be highly effective especially if when concerning the daunting process of technological 
upgrading, as an example he mentions the governments of the East Asian Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs).  
 
The importance of financial market regulation 
 
The concept of regulation is closely related to that of competition policy and it this is the first 
considerable departure from the original consensus. The original consensus for deregulation, 
especially of the financial markets, however, the insistence on regulation. As shall be made clear a 
bit later, the Post-Washington Consensus supports trade liberalization and privatization as key 
building blocks of successful economic policy,  however Stiglitz is careful to show that they that 
they are not goals in and of themselves noting that “...[privatisation and trade liberalisation] are not 
ends in themselves” Stiglitz (1998,  p.6). This is the same thinking that is applied to regulation. 
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Regulation, along with competition and adequate competition policy are seen as being necessary for 
“...a less distorted, more competitive, more efficient marketplace” (1998, p.6) 
According to Stiglitz, regulation serves four main purposes in the functioning of efficient financial 
markets. The first main purpose of regulation has is prudential regulation, this kind of regulation 
ensures safety and soundness of financial markets. Secondly, regulation is responsible for 
promoting competition. Third, regulation protects the consumers in the financial markets. Lastly, it 
ensures that underserved groups have some access to capital. How it achieves some of these goals, 
especially the last one, seems dubious. The American Community Reinvestment Act is given as 
example of how regulation ensured that minorities and poor communities received funds and how 
the Federal National Mortgage Association provided easier access to home loans. The problem with 
these examples is that it is not make clear how regulation can assist in a context where the 
underserved groups are in fact the bulk of the population, as is the case with most developing 
nations. 
Additionally, the PWC insists that in developing countries market failure is more common resulting 
in a scenario where they require greater reliance on regulation, competition and anti-trust legislation 
for privatisation‟s supposed benefits to be realised. Cramer notes that if this thinking taken to its 
logical conclusion, markets in low-income countries need to rely more on intervention, an argument 
that the PWC fails to make. More importantly however, Cramer considers regulation ineffective to 
actual development. There is no room in the Post-Washington Consensus for consideration of the 
complex policies that are required for effective sectoral growth. These go beyond relative prices to 
marketing, branding, quality, R&D, raw material supply renovation, supportive infrastructure, 
diverse relationships between participants in an industry or a commodity chain, and organisational 
capabilities. Responses to these issues tend to involve the creation of imperfect competition 




Reducing the size of government, budget deficit and the current account deficit  
 
A second component of the PWC's strategy to ensure macroeconomic stability has the suggestion of 
reducing the size of government, the budget deficit, and the current account deficit. This component 
is premised on reducing the size of three crucial factors of the macroeconomy; the size of 
government, the budget deficit and the current account deficit. . The details of the argument of why 
the deficits need reduction are not explicitly argued; rather the thinking seems to follow in the 
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mould of its neoliberal predecessor. Thinking that guides these two policy prescriptions is the idea 
that the There is no simple formula for determining the optimum level of the current account and 
budget deficit 
 
The argument for the reduction of the size of government is in fitting with the central thrust of the 
PWC, which envisages the role of government as beginning and ending at facilitating the market 
and ensuring that market failures are corrected. Because of this, government size must be limited to 
what it necessary only for facilitating the market. When discussing the failures of the Washington 
Consensus, Stiglitz (1999, p.18) opines that some state enterprises were inefficient, their losses 
contributed to the government‟s budget deficit, adding to macroeconomic instability. In an example 
about reducing the size of the fiscal deficit, Ghana‟s privatisation of the banking sector was 
designed to improve competition and by so doing improve credit allocation to the private sector. 
Cramer (1999) argues that the actual results have, however, been disappointing because of the 
government‟s fiscal deficit has meant that public borrowing has increased and Treasury bills offer 
high interest rates at low risk so banks are holding nearly 70 per cent of deposits in treasury bills 
 
Promoting free trade 
 
Trade liberalization that would eventually lead to free trade was a fundamental part of the 
Washington Consensus and so is the case for the PWC. This component was clearly central the 
original Washington Consensus. Arguing that the emphasis on free trade was inevitable, Stiglitz 
asserts “...that import substitution proved a highly ineffective strategy for development” Stiglitz 
(1998, p. 18). Its inefficiencies could be seen by some countries industries showing the twin effects 
of stunted innovation and production taking place with negative value added. Acknowledging the 
potentially disastrous effects of unbridled competition on burgeoning industries, especially those in 
the technological sector, Stiglitz states “... that competition from abroad would have provided an 
important source of competition. But it is possible that in the one-sided race, domestic firms would 
have dropped out of the competition rather than enter the fray” and “trade liberalization is thus 
neither necessary nor sufficient for creating a competitive and innovative economy Stiglitz (1998, p. 
18)  important sense of its having evolved to embrace further components:  
However, equally as clear is that protection and subsidy is a crucial component of successful 
productive growth, they have played an important part of virtually every successful industrialisation 
experience. Chang suggests that free trade is preferable only at a certain and certainly very 
advanced stage of economic development otherwise free trade has the potential of undermining the 







The PWC reforms the thinking behind the thrust for privatization however the PWC doesn't discard 
the actual the thrust itself. Rather the strategy that is used is insisting that the emphasis on 
privatization over the last decade of the WC had been the result of a focus on profit incentives 
rather than from the genuine concern over the lack of competition. Therefore an important aspect 
the Post-Washington Consensus is its continued support for privatization. Cramer (1999, p1) are 
that the Post-Washington Consensus conception of privatisation initially seems like it differs from 
the WC view that was reflected in the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s.  
He maintains that it differs primarily in that it contains “... a less ideologically dogmatic attachment 
to privatisation as developmental panacea” Cramer (1999, p1). Cramer goes on to suggest that the 




















The National Development Plan  
 
The National Development Plan and the Post-Washington Consensus 
 
Having developed an understanding of the Post Washington Consensus throughout the literature 
review and the discussion, the analytical now work moves to the important task of establishing 
whether this policy shift in particular is the broader economic thinking that the National 
Development Plan is influenced by. This task has been made simpler by our analysis of the PWC, as 
this has brought the central concepts that shall be compared with the development plan. As an initial 
disclaimer, it is important to understand that the suggestion that the policy shift in mainstream 
economics influenced the NDP and did not completely frame it, as such, differences between the 
two (PWC and NDP) whilst not plentiful, still exist. 
The National Development Plan is a developmental strategy that essentially is made up of three 
significant phases, the diagnostic stage, where the commission examined existing research and 
commission some reports to ascertain the scale and nature of their task. Following that was the 
planning stage, the various workshops that gave rise to the actual NDP. The commission see 
themselves as being in the final stage of the plan, the implementation phase. Before we begin to 
strip the essential features of the NDP, some disclaimers are in order. The idea that the PWC could 
have influenced the NDP is a completely separate one to the idea that the PWC caused the NDP. 
The argument being made in this paper is that the PWC influenced the NDP and not that these 
international developments somehow having a causal role in the development of the policy. The 
nature of that influence and how it came to influence are issues that can only be determined after the 
extent of the intellectual overlap has been found. What now follows is an analytical examination of 
the NDP framed by the essential features of the Post Washington Consensus. Framing the 
discussion with these concepts will give us a clearer picture of the relationship between the plan and 
the trends in international development institutions policy. 
 
 
Controlling inflation  
The extent to which the policy of inflation targeting is discussed as the reserve bank strategy is very 
minimal in the actual NDP. However, some clues on how the topic of inflation ought to be 
controlled, or more importantly how what levels of inflation are permitted and which are too 
excessive are alluded to. The plan briefly argues that a possible recession in the European Union 
would dampen the levels of growth in the South African economy predominantly because of their 
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position as South Africa's biggest trade partner. The steps South Africa can take to mitigate the risks 
of this in the medium term are to use monetary policy to balance the conflicting needs between 
curbing inflation and keeping the maintaining adequate levels of economic growth. In addition, 
using counter-cyclical fiscal policy would enable the government to build in “macro-policy 
cushions” that would allow our economy to counteract the effects of the financial crisis. A hint that 
the conservative fiscal policies first introduced by GEAR are to be still be supported in the NDP is 
evident, as the following quote indicates  “[c]ontinued fiscal discipline is important, though a more 
expansionary stance might be necessary if the EU contracts” NDP (, p.113). In additional the plan 
prescribes that “Counter-cyclical fiscal policy and low and stable inflation are key elements of this 
supportive macroeconomic approach. This is especially true in a minerals-exporting economy 
where external prices can have a destabilising impact on the non-minerals sector.” 
From this then, it becomes clear that the NDP prescribes that South Africa continues using the 
policy of inflation targeting. As is the case in the intellectual foundations of the PWC, this is not 
done explicitly. However, ideas from the heterodoxy are not explored; a patent example is the 
failure to investigate the implications of the employment targeting. This situation leaves us with 
little room to not acknowledge that both the both the PWC and NDP tacitly argue for the status quo 
due to the minimal thinking on the strategies of monetary policy.  
Encouraging competition and enacting competition policy 
 
One of the key proposals in Chapter 3 is the suggestion that we should take steps to increase 
competition in the regulated sectors. This should be done in addition to extending price regulation 
to sectors that are natural monopolies. Simultaneously, the government should promote more robust 
competition it should ensure this result using competition laws. Bizarrely the NDP claims that 
“industrial policy should allow for learnings and for timely exit strategies.” NDP (2011, p. 118) this 
is not incorrect; however, it certainly is bizarre because the first levels of the argument are not 
made. This realisation is one that adds the caveat to policy that aims to promote domestic 
manufacturing by limiting foreign competition, the infant industry protection argument. What is 
strange is that the argument is not made however the exit strategies are still insisted upon. The NDP 
goes further to argue certain features of our economy mean that there is a high cost structure. These 
features include our relatively small market and distance from major trading partners. These, and 
the fact that major sectors of the South African economy have developed in an uncompetitive 




 In arguing for increased competition, the NDP states that monopolies have developed in a 
considerable amount of public and private of sectors. As a result they have used their market 
dominance to charge excessively high prices. The biggest impact of this is in the sectors, such as 
electricity or steel, those provide the crucial inputs of the production process. The NDP therefore 
makes several proposals in the areas of regulatory reform, infrastructure investment, competition 
law and the quality of public services to address these structural features, thereby contributing to 
lower costs for businesses that aim to address this lack of competition. Critical here is that all these 
actions are designed to be facilitative of the market, very much in line with PWC thinking. Cramer 
insight is crucial to note however , he references Chang that  “What the analytical underpinning of the 
Washington approach misses is that restricted competition, industrial regulation aimed not at stimulating 
maximum competition but at reducing some dimensions of competition while perhaps stimulating 
rivalry, and indeed policies to provoke co-operation, might be highly effective...”Cramer (1999, p.8) 
 
The importance of labour market regulation 
 
The NDP goes into considerable depth with the idea of regulation. Whilst the explicit topic of 
regulation of the financial market is not as dominant in the NDP, it is not even mentioned or 
discussed; the idea of regulation is discussed by the plan with particular emphasis on the labour 
market. Looking at the idea in the labour market provides a useful parallel to the emphasis on 
financial market regulation in the PWC literature. It would therefore be important to note that this 
must be considered a point of similarity, especially in regard to the envisaged role of regulation. The 
reason why financial market regulation is not as important a theme in the NDP has a got to do with 
context. South Africa, unlike the United States, has tight financial market controls and did not 
undergo an extreme deregulation during the period of the original consensus. The economic 
infrastructure chapter NDP (2011, p.163) of the plan argues that regulation has the best results in 
environments where there is sufficient political will supporting it. The environment would be one 
where regulators are legally independent have public accountability whilst making transparent 
decisions and where the regulator is backed by adequate institutional, and human capacity. NDP 
(2011, p.163) 
Improved regulatory performance is vital for national development. Capacity building remains a 
core challenge, requiring sustained training to improve leadership and technical capabilities. The 
plan goes on to give proposals to improving regulation including conducting reviews of 
infrastructure regulators to clarify roles, strengthen accountability, update legislation and 
regulations, and reform institutional design. Exploring the possibilities of further consolidation of 
regulators are strategies that are also suggested. One suggestion that was made by the NDP which 
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has since been implemented is the idea to establish a monitoring and evaluation unit in the 
Presidency that is to undertake periodic regulatory impact reviews and provide advice and support 
to the regulatory authorities. How much actual support has been provided is still to be determined. 
Quite usefully for our purposes, when prescribing the role of the state the NDP states that “Among 
other actions, the state must enhance regulation of market participation, identify and resolve market 
failures, provide appropriate public infrastructure and services, and help to lower transaction costs 
across the economy” NDP (, p. 157) These sentences serve as evidence of the idea that there is a 
link between the NDP and PWC thinking. These are the shared goals of both the NDP and the 
PWC, giving credence to the idea that the NDP is considerably influenced by. 
 
Reducing the size of government, budget deficit and the current account deficit  
 
In this regard, the NDP is considerably different to the PWC. The size of government is not 
emphasised or in fact explored in the NDP, rather the focus squarely lies with the capabilities of the 
state. For the conception of government, it is not possible to rely only, or even mostly on Chapter 3, 
rather Chapter 13 titled “Building a capable and developmental state” is more useful. The chapter 
argues for a state that looks significantly different to the one that is currently in place at the 
moment. It is a conception of the government that is not a mirror image of the one that the PWC 
suggests.  
The first main difference is that the NDP develops a different view of the role of government. Even 
though the view has been influenced by the PWC thinking, it has departed significantly from the 
prescriptions of the PWC. The NDP prescribes a state that is capable of playing a developmental 
and transformative role. It prescribes a public service needs an understanding of the development 
agenda. This public service would also need protection from political interference.  This approach 
focuses on the long-term skills development to create capable members of the public service. 
Improving relations between national, provincial and local government requires a proactive 
approach to resolving coordination problem another critical goal is synthesizing the activities of the 
different spheres of government. Lastly, Chapter 13 also argues for improved governance structures 
for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that ensure accountability and stable leadership. 
 
Macroeconomic Stabilisation and Long Term Output  
 
The NDP argues that there has been successful macroeconomic stabilisation in the past; this perhaps 
isn‟t surprising knowing that the former finance minister responsible for that is now the chair of the 
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NPC. This claim extremely is questionable, especially because of the rampant poverty that 
continued unabated, unemployment remained unacceptably high, inequality still characterises the 
economy. Thus the claim that stabilisation has been successful is untrue on the balance of the 
evidence. Very high levels of capital flight, entrenched patterns of owners, considerable 
financialisation of the economy and a lack of developmental elite make us seriously question the 




The topic of privatization is dealt with in any meaningful depth in the NDP. This however can be 
put down to the significant success of the privatization that was so central to GEAR and AsgiSa. 
The NDP is reads like policy made in a post-privatization context. No attempts at reversing some of 
the problems caused by this privatization are offered in the NDP, presumably because it tacitly 
supposes the facilitation of privatization. 
 
Promoting free trade 
 
The issue of free trade is similar to issue of privatization which was dealt with substantially with 
previous economic policies that had the same influences from international orthodox institutions. 
Therefore it also receives little attention in the NDP whilst taking it for granted that our economy 
exists in a free trade context. No alternatives to this policy standpoint are explored. 
 
 
An evaluation of the NDP 
 
This section will just reconcile what the literature revealed about the NDP and how it fares as a 
developmental strategy for South Africa, based on the insights that have been garnered from the 
preceding investigation. Here, the aim is to offer an evaluation of the NDP and investigate more 
clearly what the actual implications are of it having the intellectual influence that has been argued 
for in the course of this paper. The style of the document is discussed and is followed by a 
discussion about the substantive issues that give rise to various implications. These implications are 





On first reading, the National Development Plan seems to offer a holistic approach to 
developmental strategy and planning even though it is a difficult text to read. It is arduous to read 
for two significant reasons. The first is that the policy is clearly a result of the thinking of a varied 
amount of people (26 Commissioners) and therefore does not read like a single, unified document.  
The presence of inconsistencies is also attributable to this. The second reason why the document is 
not easily read is due to its lack of scholarliness. The incorrect application of concepts is the first 
sign of this, concepts like developmental state, comparative advantage and whatever else to name 
but a few, makes it seem like terms were used so that the NDP could cash in on buzzwords, rather 
than academically addressing their applicability to the South African context. The document 
contains no direct references and important information like the theoretical influences is not made 
available and can thus only be found after an extensive research investigation such as this one. 
These two issues combined make the task of reading the NDP a significantly difficult one, so 
difficult in fact it is inconceivable that the ordinary South African read it unless they had to. The 
problem that this creates is that the policy then becomes inaccessible to those people it is 
purportedly trying to help and becomes fodder for those residing in ivory towers. These problems 
with the way the NDP is written, significant as they are, do not begin to compare with the enormous 
scale of the substantive problems with the document as economic policy. 
 
Substantively the NDP discusses competition, competition policy and regulation. The analysis of 
these policies is, as has been proved, heavily reliant on the Post Washington Consensus. This 
analysis falls short however. The lack of delineation of what kind of competition, whether it is 
domestic internal competition or international external, makes the analysis simplistic and removed 
from actual development challenges. As mentioned, a case can be made to limit international 
external competition whilst encouraging domestic competition, especially in strategically 
determined sectors, such as manufacturing. When determining what the South African economy 
needs, it is puzzling to think that the NDP doesn‟t focus on manufacturing as the lynch pin for 
development, simply because of the tremendous rewards that can be reaped if this is done 
successfully, South Korea being an immediate example. The South African economy needs 
manufacturing to be assisted to renew production for our domestic market, as the country is overly 
reliant on exports. An enhanced strategy for industrialization that integrates local inputs in upstream 
and downstream industries is essential. Beneficiation and enhancing agro-industry are also 
suggestions that have been made in the heterodoxy but are not significantly explored in the NDP. 
Problems with a having treasury that is too powerful are also not acknowledged in the plan.  
 
Another major problem with the NDP is that it does not create an institutional centre for 
31 
 
government-wide economic planning. Even though this was clearly the attempt, the NPC falls short 
of this. The first reason for this is that the NPC does not have an institutional basis. The 
commission, like all other commissions assembled by the president, is an ad hoc body that came 
together to formulate the NDP and not a permanent centre that will ensure consistency in economic 
policy across all relevant government departments, the NPC secretariat notwithstanding. Because of 
this, it does not have the ability to address the issue of policy incoherence and clutter; rather it 
simply contributes to this problem. Additionally, the scope and scale of NDP and NPC. One prong 
in a multi-prong' strategy  that should serve to reinforce the other prongs instead our NDP dilutes it. 
Secondly and more problematically, the externalisation of the NPC has limited its power and to 
some extents its adoption as effective government policy.  
 
The important issue of capital flight is not dealt with or explored by the plan either, again, hindering 
its ability to address issues at the heart of our economy‟s underdevelopment.  The scale and 
implications on developmental strategy of this problem cannot be overstated. Capital flight levels in 
South Africa are astonishingly high, at levels higher than 20% of GDP in 2007, at the same time and 
not unrelated; levels of investment in the economy have been dismally low. The link between these 
two facts is identified by Ashman et al (2014) where the authors note that problems with investment 
levels in South Africa are not due to an inadequate surplus, rather they are due to high levels of the 
surplus being removed from the economy, with a considerable amount of it being removed illegally 
Ashman et al (2014, p. 2).  Closely related to this issue is the problem of the financialisation of the 
South African economy, another crucial reality of our economy that was not picked up by the 
diagnostic reports or the plan itself. The argument made by Ashman et al (2014, p. 2) is that the 
increasing financialisation has significant implications for the economy, including bolstering the 
strength of domestic and international financial elites and importantly for this study the effect it is 
has had on policy making viz. the displacement of decision making to financial elites to the 
detriment of the rest of society because of the influence of neoliberal thinking. The only that I 
would add is that the NDP is clear evidence of this. 
 
 Additionally, another weakness of the NDP is their analysis of the economy, that doesn‟t use the 
Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) concept in its thinking. Originally pioneered by Fine, & 
Rustomjee (1998), the concept relates to the entrenched accumulation pattern in South Africa. The 
MEC is an incredibly useful concept, especially taking into account recent updates to it that argue 
that at the core of the financialisation MEC has been financialized. The failure to use this concept 
leaves the NDP without the structural dimensions of the South African accumulation, which 





A problem that was identified in during the course of the study is the externalisation of planning 
capacity that is one of the biggest shortcomings of the NPC and therefore also of the NDP. The 
planning commission is has no power to co-ordinate economic policy within government, and this 
being the case, means that the NDP does nothing to relieve the policy congestion in South Africa. 
Furthermore, the impact that it has on the implementation of the NDP should not be underestimated. 
The government departments that are tasked with implementing the plan have had no say in its 
development, and there is no one from the NPC in each of the departments to ensure 
implementation.  
 
The final issue affecting the NDP is the general dissonance between the theory and practice of the 
Post Washington Consensus. One of the critical problems of the original consensus was that the 
practise of the consensus was so removed from the theory that was supposed to be informing it. The 
same weakness is present with the PWC and considering how much of the NDP is influenced by the 






















The Process of Policy Formulation   
 
The final part of the study takes us from the Post-Washington Consensus and the National 
Development Plan and asks questions that are far more abstract in nature. How is policy formed, 
and more importantly, how was the National Development Plan formed? Having now found that the 
NDP is heavily influenced by the Post Washington Consensus, it is reasonable to then ask if the 
process by which the plan was developed was somehow responsible for this link. Did it facilitate 
the link? These are questions that will be answered once the literature that was alluded to in the 
literature review has been analysed in the context of what we know of the process that gave rise to 
the NDP.  
 
This subsection will begin with analysis of the policy process in general terms, examining the 
theories that explain the process. This will be done so as to be able to select the appropriate 
analytical framework to apply to the NDP‟s policy. This will be followed by an examination of the 




To begin, as we have seen, Sabatier (1999) argues that public necessarily goes through four steps 
that make a cycle. Initially, problems are articulated either by government or presented to 
government for solution. The governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy 
solutions. Finally, the proposed solutions are then implemented, evaluated, and revised. Whilst the 
circumstances of the NDP are not the same as they would be under normal governmental policy, the 
general cycle holds true for the NDP. How things unfolded in the NDP shall be explored in greater 
detail in the following section, for now, it is important simply to note that its development has 
tracked the cycle as presented by Sabatier.  
 
There are a multitude of theories in the social sciences that are used to explain how policy is 
formed. Due to the plethora of possibilities, there is a wide range of theories that can be used to 
understand the dynamics of what is often an unclear and protracted process. For the purposes of this 
study, it is not necessary to explore all of the different possibilities; rather, we will explore the two 
theories that can aid our understanding of the NDP process. The two theories that will suite this 
purpose will be the Coalition Theory or Advocacy Coalition Framework propagated chiefly by 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith and the “Power Politics” or Power Elites Theory pioneered C. Wright 
Mills and Domhoff. The Coalition Theory or Advocacy Coalition Framework, work that is rooted 
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in political studies, maintains that policy change comes about through coordinated activity among a 
range of individuals with the same core policy beliefs and this coalition is then responsible for 
bringing about the relevant policy change. Stachowiak (1999, p. 7) suggests that this theory is most 
useful in instances where a sympathetic administration is incumbent or a strong group of allies with 
a common goal is in place or can be formed. On the other hand, the “Power Politics” theory, a 
theory that is based in sociology argues that policy change comes as a result of working directly 
with those with power to make decisions or influence decision making Stachowiak (1999, p. 10).  
 
The coalition theory is brought into this analysis so as to provide a clear counterpoint to the process 
that was followed in making the NDP. This theory proposes that a policy coalition is formed when 
individuals have core beliefs about policy areas, including a problem‟s severity, its root causes, and 
mounts a concerted effort to developing solutions for addressing it Stachowiak (1999, p. 10). It is 
known that this was not the case in the NDP. The individuals that were part of the development of 
this policy were not united by an overarching ideal to identify the South African problems that 
needed addressing. Rather the individuals or the National Planning Commissioners were tasked to 
develop the NDP by Presidential decree. This, in itself, affects the dynamics of the task. However, 
what is clear from the onset is that the coalition theory does not apply when thinking of the NDP 
policy process.  
 
NDP Policy Process 
 
As has been described, the National Development Plan originated with the President of the 
Republic setting up the National Planning Commission. The logic that was used to establish the 
commission was as follows. The commission was to be made up of stakeholders and experts from a 
vast array of backgrounds and ideological orientations. The National Planning Commission would 
be supported by a small bureaucratic team stationed in the presidency called the NPC secretariat. 
The commission would meet in plenary discussions and break away into working groups focussing 
on specialised areas, like the economy, education, health etc. Crucially, the commission was to be 
chaired by ex-finance minister and well known Washington sympathiser, Mr Trevor Manuel. It 
would be Vice Chaired by Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, one of the richest men in South Africa and calling 
him a BEE beneficiary would be an understatement, the commission also included Mr Joel 
Netshitenzhe, Dr Miriam Altman, Mr Robert Godsell, Professor Anton Adriaan Eberhard and Mr 
Elias Masilela. This cohort of commissioners are the most likely to have driven the Post-
Washington Consensus agenda in the NDP. These commissioners were balanced out by Prof. 
Christopher Malikane, whose ideological clashes with the dominant cohort resulted in talk that he 
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stopped attending workshops and silently withdrew from the planning process and Professor. Karl 
von Holdt, who, like Professor Malikane is a University of Witwatersrand academic whose track 
record suggests he attempted to limit the PWC thinking in the Plan. As the nature of the ideological 
clashes is not known and there was no minority report produced, the truth of these claims is still 
undetermined. The most important point however is that the process of drafting the actual plan, the 
intellectual haggling over ideas, deciding what is important enough to go in, what should be left out, 
why? This entire process has not been revealed and the only information relating to this is with the 
individual commissioners themselves. 
 
Once the commission had been set up, their first task was to ascertain the scale and nature of the 
challenges facing South Africa. The commission achieved this through examining commissioned 
and existing research around the subject matter. The diagnostic reports are introduced as being a set 
of analyses that seek to identify high-level issues that are critical to determining an economic path 
that will benefit all South Africans. It is informed by work that has been done by a range of 
agencies, including: The Macroeconomic Research Group in the early 1990s, The Department of 
Finance in 1996, The government‟s Ten and Fifteen Year Reviews, The International Growth 
Advisory Panel (the so-called Harvard Group) The Human Sciences Research Council‟s 
Employment Scenarios, The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the IMF. Interestingly, the plan lists other economic research on the South African economy, 
such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions growth path document and the New Growth 













Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
The preceding investigation has established a clear link between the Post Washington Consensus 
and the National Development Plan. These links were identified most strongly in the how the plan 
understands the role of government and competition, competition policy and regulation. This has 
the result of the NDP suffering from weaknesses from its influencing theory that compromise the 
plan‟s ability to meaningfully address the plethora of problems facing South African society. The 
effect that these links have had on the policy making process are vast. Not only has orthodox 
economic policy maintained its stronghold in South Africa, but the failure to acquire the ability to 
integrate ideas from the heterodoxy has come at the expense of the South African people. The 
policy process therefore can be explained by neither the coalition theory but can be cursorily 
explained by the power politics theory. In order to make a determination on whether commissioners 
with dominant economic positions represent the powerful interests in the economy and thus the 
adoption of such market friendly policy with a minimal developmental impact another study that 
contains interviews with national planning commissioners would be need to be conducted. This 
investigation did not determine that the entire NDP is useless, or that there are no positives to it, 
rather that the weakness that have been highlighted have the result of compromising its potential 
success. Therefore the NDP is not successful in charting a development trajectory to drastically 
improve our economy and our society. 
 
In order to more adequately address the issues in our economy, based on the insights gained from 
this study, the recommendations are as follows: 
 
 Internalize the economic policy and general development strategy planning capacity to 
the government. This important function needs to have a robust institutional basis. This is 
essential to co-ordinating economic policy within government and ensuring the 
implementation of the decided strategy.  
 Develop policy based on the realities of the economy, more accurate and useful set of 
diagnostic reports. The use of concepts like the Minerals-Energy Complex and 
financialisation could have been explored to get to grips with the very concerning levels of 
capital flight from our economy.  
 Establish a clearer approach to industrial policy and how it interacts with development 
strategy. The NDP fails to come up with a long term strategy for increasing industrial 
activity in our economy. It also fails to develop strategies of how best to support the 
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Department of Trade and Industry‟s Industrial Policy Action Plan. These are absolutely 
essential to the development process. 
 Limit the influence of IMF and World Bank theory on development strategy. These 
Washington based institutions have no track record of successfully aiding development in 
developing countries, no matter how much they argue the opposite. The political economy 
reasons of why these institutions are significant, but not to the present study. For our 
purposes it is simply enough to acknowledge that these institutions are dominated by 
developed countries and thus are unlikely to genuinely represent developing country 
interests. It is the duty of the NDP to represent South Africa‟s interests and not the interests 
of these institutions. 
 Further study into the extent to which this influence was conscious or deliberate. 
Whilst this study has revealed that there was definitely a link between the NDP and the 
PWC, it was not the within the ambit of the investigation to investigate the nature of this 
link. Further study could examine the nature of this link and how conscious the 
commissioners were that they were influencing the NDP with the PWC. This can be done 
whilst examining the nature of how the prescriptions were arrived at. This study would not 
be possible without in depth qualitative interviews with individual commissioners. These 
interviews were originally supposed to be part of the study; however, logistical constraints 
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